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Abstract
We study experimental markets where privately informed traders exchange simple assets, and where
uninformed third parties are asked to forecast the values of these assets, guided only by market prices.
Although prices only partially aggregate information, they signicantly improve the forecasts of third
parties. In a second treatment, a portion of traders are given preferences over the forecasts made by
observers. Although we nd evidence that these traders attempt to manipulate prices in order to inuence
the beliefs of observers, we nd no evidence that observers make less accurate forecasts as a result.
1 Introduction
An important property of prices in asset markets is their ability to summarize dispersed information. Indeed,
prices in secondary nancial markets are important forecasting tools for primary investors and serve a
vital role in guiding the allocation of capital. This property of prices has motivated practitioners in rms,
governments and academia to establish markets for the express purpose of forecasting uncertain future
events. These "prediction markets" have been used to forecast presidential elections, sporting outcomes,
project completion dates, geopolitical events and futures sales of soon to be released products. These markets
appear to be very good predictors of future events (Wolfers and Zitzewitz , 2004; Forsythe et. al. , 1992)
and therefore may hold great promise as forecasting tools for decision makers in business and government.
Recently, critics have raised two concerns calling into question the usefulness of asset markets as decision
making tools. First, there is some debate about the interpretability of prices as estimators of probabilities
of future events. Although recently this debate has centered on theoretical concerns about aggregation,
there exists long standing experimental evidence suggesting that asset market prices are often imperfectly
ecient and therefore serve as imperfect probability estimates (Forsythe and Lundholm , 1990; Hanson et.
al. , 2006). Wealth constraints, informational thinness, insucient time for proper convergence, insucient
trader experience and even trader irrationality can result in imperfect information aggregation. In such
contexts it is unclear whether and how successfully decision makers can use prediction markets as forecasting
tools.
Second, some observers worry that asset markets may be vulnerable to price manipulation. If traders
have preferences over decisions made based on asset prices, they may be willing to take losses in the market
in order to inuence prices and thereby alter observers' beliefs. Indeed it was, in part, such concerns that
1lead Congress to shut down the Policy Analysis Market (Tucker and Meirowitz , 2004), a prediction market
established by the defense department to aggregate intelligence data for policy makers.
We report an experiment designed to assess these concerns. In our experiment, traders with noisy signals
regarding the value of an asset trade that asset in a double auction. A separate set of uninformed subjects
observe the price series and, afterwards, attempt to forecast the asset's value. Although prices in these
markets are imperfectly ecient (and are, in some cases, severely biased), observers manage to use them to
signicantly improve their forecasts.
In a second treatment, half of the population of traders are given preferences over observers' forecasts.
These traders attempt to manipulate prices and in some cases succeed in mildly altering average contract
prices. This manipulation, however, has no negative impact on the accuracy of observer forecasts. Our
ndings suggest that even if prediction markets are imperfectly ecient and subject to manipulation they,
nevertheless, may be useful forecasting tools.
It is worth noting that, although our experiment was motivated by prediction markets, the problems
we examine are relevant to naturally occurring asset markets as well. Our results suggest that primary
investors observing secondary prices may be capable of anticipating and correcting for some biases in the
price formation process when making forecasts. Thus even inecient prices may serve as useful guides for
capital allocation decisions. Moreover, our experiment suggests that it is dicult for traders to aect capital
ows by manipulating asset market prices.
The aggregative properties of prices were rst noted by Hayek (1945) and were formally examined by
Muth (1961). In 1988, implementation and eld experimentation with prediction markets began in the Iowa
Electronic Market, a prediction market established to forecast the outcomes of political elections. (Wolfers
and Zitzewitz , 2004) provides a useful overview of progress in the eld.
Plott and Sunder (1988) conducted pioneering experiments studying information aggregation in asset
markets. Though they reported aggregation in some of their markets, this aggregation was imperfect and
severely sensitive to theoretically benign institutional features of the market in which trade took place.
Follow up work by Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) examining factors aecting aggregation concluded, in
part, that trader experience has a substantial eect on informational eciency of prices. Recently Manski
(2004) has argued that theoretically, even absent such factors, prediction market prices may do a poor job at
summarizing dispersed information. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005) and Gjerstad (2005) have countered that,
assuming moderate levels of risk aversion, prediction market prices can credibly be interpreted as probability
estimates.
Prior evidence on the vulnerability of prediction markets to manipulation is mixed. A eld experiment
by Camerer (1998) failed to produce evidence of successful manipulation in racetrack betting markets.
However, in a second eld experiment Hansen et. al. (2004) successfully inuenced prices in the Iowa
2Electronic Market. Hanson and Oprea (2004) present a microstructure model in which manipulators create
liquidity by trading and can therefore have net positive eects on price accuracy. Hanson et. al. (2006)
conduct a laboratory experiment in which a subset of traders are given incentives to directly raise the level
of the price. Though these traders do in fact attempt to manipulate prices, their incentives are common
knowledge and they are countered by the rest of the market. Strumpf and Rhode (2003) provide evidence
that 19th century eorts to manipulate betting markets also failed to negatively aect eciency.
The remainder of this paper will be organized as follows. In section 2, we describe our experimental
design. In section 3 we present our empirical questions and present corresponding results in section 4. We
conclude the paper in section 5.
2 Experimental Design
In a baseline treatment, a subset of subjects (traders) trade a common value asset in a standard double
auction after receiving noisy signals about the asset's value. A set of uninformed subjects (observers) watch
the market and, using trading data, attempt to forecast the value. In a second treatment, half of the trading
subjects are paid a bonus depending on how well the observers' forecast matches a private target. These
traders therefore may have incentives to use the market to aect observer beliefs.
2.1 Information Environment and Trader Prots
Our experiment consist of a series of asset markets with 8 traders, each endowed with 200 in currency and
2 shares of a binary option (an all or nothing contract) with a common value, v 2 f0;100g . Traders in
these markets are allowed to buy and sell shares in a standard double auction 1, though the true value of
these shares is uncertain. It is common knowledge, ex ante, that assets will be worthless (v = 0) or valuable
(v = 100) with equal probability. Once the market closes, Trader i's total earnings are:






Sik + V (N + Ji   Ki) (1)
C = Endowed Cash (200)
V = Realized Value of the Security (0,100)
N = Endowed Shares (2)
Ji= Number of units trader i Buys in the Market
Ki = Number of units trader i Sells in the Market
Bij = Price of Buy Contract j purchased by trader i
Sik = Price of Sell Contract k sold by trader i
1Note that traders are not allowed to short sell in these markets
3Figure 1: The expected value a fully informed Bayesian would assign to assets as a function of the number
of positive signals distributed to the market. Dark black lines show the forecast a fully informed Bayesian
would make.
Prior to a trade each trader, i, receives a private noisy signal si 2 f ;+g with replacement regarding the
value of the asset. The market, overall is therefore equipped with a vector of signals, ~ s = (s1;s2;:::;s8) . The
distribution from which signals are drawn depends on the true state, 0 or 100, of the security. If the true state
is 0, each signal is drawn uniformly and independently from f ; ;+g; if the true state is 100, each signal
is drawn similarly from f+;+; g. Urn designs such as this one are common in information aggregation
experiments. Our information environment is particularly similar to ones implemented in Anderson and
Holt [1997] and Hung and Plott [2001].
Notice that, prior to receiving a signal, a rational Bayesian trader will assign an expected value of 50 to
each share of the security. After receiving a signal, a Bayesian trader will revise this value to 1
3  100 if the
signal is - and about 2
3  100 if the signal is +.
In a perfectly revealing rational expectations equilibrium, the market price should aggregate all of the
information contained in the market, serving as a sucient statistic for the 8 signals held by market partic-
ipants. Such a price will be the expected value a Bayesian trader would assign to the asset if she had access















8 n  100 (2)
where n is the number of + signals in the market. Bayesian prices are charted in Figure 1.
In this study we are interested in how information inuences third party decision making through the
4market price. It will therefore be useful to have a metric describing the degree to which the information
behind market activity indicates one value realization versus the other. We construct a variable called signal
strength, which indicates how consistent underlying information is but is independent of the direction of
information. When n = 4, ~ s is uninformative in the sense that the prior estimate of the value and the
posterior coincide. The further n is from 4, the stronger is the indication that the asset will take one value
versus another. Denoting x = (n 4), prob(100jx) = prob(0j x), since the distributions are symmetric. We
then dene signal strength as m = jxj. A signal strength of 0 means that observation of signals would not
change the beliefs of a Bayesian after viewing ~ s. A signal strength of 4 means that such a Bayesian would
be virtually certain of the asset's value.
2.2 Observer Incentives
In addition to 8 traders inside the market, there are 5 observers outside the market who observe trade in
the market and, after the market closes, make a forecast f 2 f0;100g . Observers have no money or shares
and are unable to trade. Instead they earn money if they make the decision f = v, correctly forecasting the





250 if f = v
0 if f 6= v:
(3)
Observers are induced with the same priors as traders. However, unlike traders, observers are provided with
no private information and must, instead, rely entirely on data from the market to guide their decisions.
In order to judge how well observers are informed by prices, it will be useful to have a benchmark to
compare their forecasts. A natural benchmark is what we will call the indicated value. The indicated value,
vI, is simply the prediction in f0;100g a risk neutral Bayesian would make after observing all 8 draws. To





100 if prob(v = 100j~ s) > 0:5
0 if prob(v = 100j~ s) < 0:5
(4)
2.3 Manipulation Incentives
The environment described in sections 2.1 and 2.2 comprises our Baseline treatment. In it, a cohort of
privately informed traders are allowed to use private information to trade in a standard double auction. A
group of observers observe trade and, after the market closes, attempt to forecast the true value of assets
based on the time series of prices they have observed.
In a second treatment, called Forecast Preferences, we provide half of the traders (4 traders) in the market
with preferences over observers forecasts, f. Before the market opens these preference traders are assigned
5the same random target t, drawn uniformly from f0;100g. Preference traders are provided incentives to
inuence observers to make decisions, f, which approach this target. After trade, preference trader total
earnings are equal to their earnings as a trader, t, plus a bonus that depends on the average forecasts of
observers. Earnings for preference traders are:






where Fj is the forecast of observer j. Preference traders, therefore, have some incentives to inuence decision
making and to inuence it in a direction which is, ex ante, uncorrelated with the true value of the asset.
2.4 Discussion of Design
Our experimental design is optimized to study how asset market prices perform as forecasting tools when
markets suer from two pathologies. First, we introduce bias into the price by mirroring the distribution of
assets and currency used in Hanson et. al. (2006) . The limited number of shares distributed to subjects
(combined with no short selling provision) limits the degree to which traders can inuence prices downwards
while ample currency makes bidding prices up relatively easy. The result in Hanson et. al. (2006) was a
persistent bias in prices relative to perfect aggregation. Replicating this environment allows us to study how
well observers foresee and adjust for these biases in prices when forecasting.
Second, our Forecast Preferences treatment is designed to give traders a strong opportunity and incentives
to obscure information in the market price through manipulation. A key feature of the implementation of
the treatment is that the target observer forecst is known neither to non-preference traders nor to observers.
As a result non-preference traders cannot anticipate and automatically react to manipulation attempts as
they do in Hanson et. al. (2006). Moreover, without knowing the incentives of preference traders, observers
can expect noisier information coming from a successfully manipulated market, rendering it a less reliable
tool. This feature of the design allows us to study whether unpredictable and unobserved manipulation
campaigns might short circuit the use of and reliability of prices for the purpose of forecasting.
2.5 Experiments and Experimental Procedures
Each experimental session consisted of 16 periods,2 with each period constituting a distinct market. In each
period a new asset value was drawn, trader accounts were reset so that they had 200 in cash and 2 shares
of the asset, traders were assigned new signals, preference traders received new targets and observers made
new decisions once the market closed.
Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate population at George Mason University and given a $5
show-up payment upon arrival. The subjects went through a detailed instruction period with written and oral
2Subjects were not told how many periods would be conducted, but were recruited for 2 hours.
6Period + Signals Indicated Signal Preference Actual
Value Strength Target, t Value
1 6 100 2 0 100
2 1 0 3 0 0
3 2 0 2 0 0
4 3 0 1 100 0
5 5 100 1 0 100
6 0 0 4 100 0
7 3 0 1 0 0
8 7 100 3 0 100
9 3 0 1 100 100
10 1 0 3 100 0
11 4 NA 0 0 100
12 2 0 2 100 0
13 6 100 2 100 100
14 4 NA 0 100 100
15 5 100 1 100 100
16 2 0 2 0 0
Table 1: Parameter design by period, providing the number of positive signals distributed, the forecast of a
fully-informed risk-neutral Bayesian, the coherence of signals distributed to the market, the observer forecast
that preference traders would prefer and the actual value of the asset. The indicated value is undened (we
write "NA") when only 4 signals are distributed to the market since, in this case, it is unclear what a risk
neutral Bayesian would forecast.
instructions. Care was taken to demonstrate the information and incentive structure in the experiment.3 We
used visual props to demonstrate the distribution from which the values and signals were drawn. In addition,
two detailed practice periods, in which payos were not calculated in an individual's total earnings, were
used to provide experience. The value of the security for each round was set to be either 0 or 100 according
to a uniform random draw. At the start of each round, each trader is given a signal about the asset's value.
The traders are informed that the signals were independently drawn, and with a 2/3 probability a + would
be drawn when the value was 100, and with a 2/3 probability a - would be drawn when the value was 0. 4
Between the two treatments we kept all elements in the design identical, including the value realizations
and the signals to traders each period, except that, in the Forecast Preferences treatment, half of all traders
were provided with a bonus based on the average of observers decisions each period. Table 1 shows, for
each period in an experimental session, the information draws (number of + signals drawn), the indicated
value, the signal strength, the preference traders' target (known only to preference traders), and the actual
realization of the security value. 5
3Instructions for the Baseline treatment can be found at http://ices2.gmu.edu/dorina/No.Manipulation.Instructions/website11.htm
and for the Forecast Preferences treatment at http://ices2.gmu.edu/dorina/Manipulation.Instructions/start.treatment1.htm
4During the experiment subjects use e-cash, which was converted to US=dollars at a rate of 190 e to 1 for traders and 110
e = 1 for judges. The exchange rate used was known to the subject prior to the start of the experiment. Subjects average
earnings per session were $32.
5Traders, preference traders and observers interacted on networked computers using Zocalo, an open-source market software
package (available at http://zocalo.sourceforge.net). The screen design and wording used on the screens can be found in the
instructions.
73 Experimental Questions
Previous experimental studies on information aggregation in asset markets have focused directly on the
relationship between trader information and the market price. Typically such experiments were designed
to examine the degree to which various functions of the price series (typically the closing price) reect or
aggregate information provided to market participants. Although not our main research questions, we are
interested in the degree to which the price transmits information underlying the market.
Question 1 Do prices aggregate distributed information?
A common concern about prediction markets is that traders with preferences over the beliefs of market
observers may attempt to manipulate prices. By taking positions that either contradict or overstate their
beliefs, a group of traders can conceivably cause observers to take on false beliefs about the direction or
quality of information distributed to traders. Our Forecast Preferences treatment allows us to examine
whether traders with preferences over the beliefs of observers attempt to manipulate these beliefs through
the market price.
Question 2 Do preference traders attempt to manipulate market prices?
A direct extension of this question is whether, following Hanson et. al. (2006) manipulation attempts
signicantly interfere with information aggregation in prices.
Question 3 Does manipulation damage the aggregative property of prices?
Our main question is whether and how well observers use market prices to inform their forecasts. Prices in
experimental prediction markets are often imperfectly ecient and cannot be straightforwardly interpreted
as estimates of expected value. It is therefore unclear whether observers will make use of prices at all. Even if
they do use prices as forecasting tools, it is dicult to know exactly how ex ante. We suspect that if observers
do use prices to inform their forecasts, relatively simple functions of the price are unlikely to capture all of
the information a decision maker is likely to glean from a price series. Including market observers as subjects
endogenizes the problem allowing us to empirically pose this fourth question:
Question 4 Do observers use information from markets to enhance their decision-making? If so, how much
does the market improve forecasting? 6
It will be dicult to fully assess the damage done by price manipulation by looking directly at the eects
of extra-market incentives on the market price. Even if traders who care about observer forecasts can aect
6Note that since observers have no private information, absent a market they cannot systematically make correct forecasts.
Any deviation from random forecasting is evidence that markets improve forecasting
8the market price through trade, it is not necessarily true that this will constitute manipulation in the sense
intended here. Because it is dicult to discern how observers interpret market prices (as discussed above),
it is dicult to know what manipulations of the market price will actually be eective in altering observer
beliefs. Furthermore, it is unclear that would-be manipulators will correctly make this assessment and
succeed in manipulating the market price. Our experimental design endogenizes the relationship between
the trades of potential manipulators and the forecasts of observers and therefore allows us to pose a nal
question:
Question 5 Do manipulators negatively impact the ability of observers to use prediction markets as a fore-
casting tool?
4 Experimental Results
We report experimental results in three sections. In section 4.1 we provide evidence that preference traders
do attempt to manipulate prices and succeed in aecting average contract prices. In section 4.2 we show that
although prices in our markets correlate with the informationally ecient price, information aggregation is
decidedly imperfect. Mirroring Hanson et. al. (2006) (in which subjects have similar levels of currency and
shares of assets), our environment results in upwardly biased prices which imperfectly adjust to variation in
underlying information . Price manipulation, however does not ultimately aect the quality of aggregation.
In section 4.3 we provides evidence that, although prices are imperfectly ecient, observers use them to
signicantly improve the quality of their forecasts.
4.1 Price Manipulation
We begin by examining whether preference traders attempt to inuence observer forecasts by manipulating
the market price (Question 2). In order to test for price manipulation we compare price oers and acceptances
made by preference traders with oers made by a similar pool of subjects from the Baseline treatment.
Intuitively, if preference traders wish to convince observers that v=100, we suspect they will mimic the
behavior of traders with positive expectations of value and make relatively high bids to buy. Likewise,
preference traders wishing to convince observers that v = 0, they will make relatively low asks to sell.
To test for manipulation, we compare the bids, asks and acceptances of preference traders with those
of a pool of subjects with identical information (and history of information) from the Baseline treatment.
We estimate the following mixed eects model which is essentially a means test of oers across treatments,
controlling for subject and session level eects.









Intercept 67.77177 55.68884 61.53712 60.53099
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
pref -7.579531 7.621655 -1.853006 6.785543
(0.011) (0.045) (0.344) (0.001)
Table 2: Mixed eects estimates from model (6) on four subsets of the data. Oers include bids in t=100
rounds and asks in t=0 rounds (and price acceptances in both). p-values are included below estimates in
parentheses.
This model is estimated on two subsets of the data. The rst is bids (and acceptances) in rounds in
which t=100 and the second is asks (and acceptances) from rounds in which t=0. Thus priceik is bids in
one regression and asks is the other. Indices are i for subject, j for session and k indexes trades within that
session. prefi is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if session i is under the Forecast Preferences
treatment and 0 otherwise, ui is a random eect on subjects assumed to be distributed N(0;u), j is a
random eect on sessions assumed to be distributed N(0;), and ijk is a disturbance term assumed to be
distributed N(0;). Estimates are presented in Table 2 (under the Oers column).
Under the hypothesis that forecast preferences have no eect on oers, the coecient on pref will be
insignicantly dierent from zero. However a positive coecient when t=100 and a negative one when
t=0 will support the alternative hypothesis that traders respond to forecast preferences by attempting to
manipulate prices. Indeed this is exactly what our estimates indicate. The coecient on pref is 7.62 when
t=100 and -7.57 when t=0 and is statistically signicant in both cases. This results in our rst nding:
Finding 1 Subjects with incentives over observer beliefs attempt to manipulate price. When t=100, bids
are higher under the Forecast Preferences treatment than under the Baseline treatment. When t=0, asks are
lower under Forecast Preferences than in the Baseline.
A related question is whether these eorts to manipulate actually alter contract prices. In order to
investigate this, we estimate (6) using only prices from the set of completed contracts. Once again we
produce separate estimates for t=0 and t=100 rounds. Results are presented in Table 2 (under the Contracts
columns). When t=100, manipulation eorts succeed in raising prices by 6.78 (p=0.001). Manipulation
appears to have no corresponding eect on prices in rounds in which t=0 (p=0.344).
Finding 2 Attempts to raise the price through manipulation succeed in raising prices by nearly 7 points;
attempts to lower prices fail.
10Figure 2: Observed closing prices (dots) and the average of these prices across sessions (black line) with fully
informed expected values (gray line).
4.2 Information Aggregation in Closing Prices
When a market fully aggregates information, its contract prices approach the expected value of assets, given
all of the information in the market. We are interested therefore (Question 1) in estimating aggregation
by looking at the relationship between the prices we observe in our markets and the expected value a fully
informed Bayesian would assign to the asset. Figure 2 shows the fully informed expected value of assets and
the average closing prices for each period, broken up by treatment. Though it is clear that closing prices are
strongly correlated with information, it is also clear that they fail to adjust fully to changes in probabilities
from period to period. Hanson et. al. (2006) report similar qualitative but incomplete correlation between
expected value and price in an experimental prediction market with similar currency and asset distributions
but a very dierent information environment.
We formally support these observations by estimating the following random eects regression:
pricejt   50 = 1 + 2prefj + 1(Ev(n)j   50) + 2prefj(Ev(n)j   50) + uj + jt: (7)
The dependent variable, pricejt   50 is the price amount of the t'th contract in treatment j, relative to the
uninformed price estimate of 50. The variable prefj is an indicator variable for the Forecast Preferences
treatment, Ev(n) is dened as in (2) and uj is a random eect on session and jt is an error term (both
assumed to be normally distributed). If the market aggregates perfectly in the Baseline treatment, the
intercept 1 will be indistinguishable from zero and the coecient on expected value, 1, will be equal to 1.
11Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 F10
Coefficient 10.20671 11.01617 11.20923 12.30581 13.03491
(0.008) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
pref 2.324719 1.206104 2.00208 1.849452 1.598616
(0.669) (0.812) (0.652) (0.643) (0.781)
Ev(n)   50 .0431189 0.0147719 0.0854649 0.1636089 0.1955946
(0.099) (0.511) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
pref 
(Ev(n)   50)
-0.0107977 0.0147755 -0.0124539 -0.0296694 -0.0397304
(0.756) (0.624) (0.669) (0.32) (0.372)
Table 3: Results from random eects model (7) estimating the relationship between the expected valuation of
a fully informed Bayesian to the price. Estimates are given for the four consecutive quarters of contracts (Q1-
Q4) and for the nal ten percent of contracts (F10). p-values are included below estimates in parentheses.
We estimate this model on 5 subsamples of the data including the rst, second, third and fourth quarters of
trades (Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4) and the nal 10% of trades. Results for each of these sub-samples are shown in
Table 3.
A rst observation is that the value of the coecient on Ev(n)i increases over the four quarters of trade
and takes its highest value during the nal 10 percent of trades, indicating that the market price increasingly
incorporates distributed information over time. During the nal half of trade (Q3, Q4, F10) the slope term
on expected value is signicantly greater than zero, indicating a relationship between the ecient price and
the realized price. Moreover, in all phases of trade, the intercept term is signicantly greater than zero
indicating a bias in the price. This is clear from Figure 2 in which prices rarely fall below 50, even when
much of the information in the market is negative.
By the end of trade (F10) there is a signicant relationship between the full-information expected value
and the market price ( 2 is signicant), though at 0.19 the coecient still lies signicantly below 1. Further,
the intercept coecient, 1, is estimated at 13, meaning that, even when the market is equipped with only
negative signals, the price fails to predict a low enough value realization (a price near 50, taken as a probability
estimate, simply reiterates the markets priors).7
We summarize these observations in our third nding:
Finding 3 Over the course of trade, prices increasingly correlate with underlying information. However,
even towards the end of trade they fail to fully aggregate and therefore cannot be straightforwardly interpreted
as probability estimates. These markets have particular trouble aggregating negative information (information
indicating a low value) resulting in prices which are upwardly biased relative to fully aggregated prices.
We can also use the estimates from (7) to assess the eects of manipulation on aggregation (Question
7The upward bias in price we observe may be due, in part, asymmetries in subject endowments; each subject could only sell
two units, but had enough cash to buy about three to four units at the observed prices. Similar bias was observed in (Hanson
et. al. , 2006)
12Figure 3: Proportion of forecasts matching the indicated value in each period and for each treatment.
3). If the interaction terms or indicator variables for the Forecast Preferences treatment are signicantly
dierent from zero, we have evidence that the relationship between price and expected value is aected by
manipulation. In fact, these interaction terms are never signicantly dierent from zero, indicating that
aggregation is not weakened by preference traders.
Finding 4 Manipulation has no eect on aggregation.
4.3 Observer Forecasts
After observing the full price series in a market, do observers, in fact, tend to make decisions that reect
signals in the market (Question 4)? Figure 3 charts the proportion of observers' predictions that match
the indicated value in each period for each treatment. It is clear that (i) in most periods the indicated
value is predicted more than 50% of the time (observations are generally above the dotted line) and (ii)
there is little dierence between data in the Baseline treatment and the Forecast Preferences treatment.
This gure therefore provides qualitative answers to both Questions 4 and 5: Observers do use information
from prediction markets to enhance their decision-making and preference traders do not aect observers
decision-making abilities.
To answer these rst questions more formally, we estimate the following random eects probit model
(without intercept):
prob(fij = vI
jj~ s) = prob(i + 1bi + 2prefi + mj(1bi + 2prefi) > ij (8)
where fij is the forecast by observer i in period j, vI
j is the indicated value, vI (the forecast a risk neutral
13Figure 4: Predictions from probit model (8), showing, for each treatment, the estimated probability the
observer forecasts the indicated value as a function of signal strength. Gray shaded areas show the 95% con-
dence interval. The dotted line on the Baseline (Forecast Preferences) panel shows the Forecast Preferences
(Baseline) estimates for easier comparison.
Bayesian would make, dened in 7) in period j given ~ s, b is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 under the
Baseline treatment, prefi is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 under the Forecast Preferences treatment,
mj is the signals strength in period j ,i is a normally distributed random eect drawn by subject and ij
is an error term assumed to be distributed normally with mean 0 and variance 1.
Table 4 provides the estimates from this model and Figure 4 shows the resulting predicted probability of
the indicated decision being made at each level of signal strength in the Baseline and Preference treatments.
The gray areas around these estimates give 95 % condence intervals on the predictions.
The coecient on signal strength in the baseline treatment, 1, is signicant and positive, indicating
that observers forecast the indicated value more frequently when the information in the market is more
consistent. From Figure 4, it is clear (with 95% condence) that, when the signal strength is greater than 1,
the probability that observers forecast the indicated value is greater than .5 (the condence interval does not
contain 0.5). However, the same is not true when the signal strength is 1. Since 0.5 is the prior distribution
over states, there is no evidence in this case that observers gather usable information from the prediction
market. We sum up these observations as a fth nding.








pref  m 0.4208571 0.156
(0.000)
b  m 0.3957784 0.146
(0.000)
Table 4: Probit estimates from model (8).
signal strength is suciently high. Observers are more likely to forecast the indicated value at higher signal
strengths.
We nally examine whether the manipulation eorts reported in ndings 1 and 2 have a negative eect
on the accuracy of observer forecasts.
In order to do this we use a Chow-type test suggested in Greene (2002) testing the hypothesis that the
intercept and slope term on signal strength jointly dier across treatments. We rst estimate the following
random eects probit model8: prob(Fij = Ijj~ s) = prob(i +  + si > ij) once with all of our data
and once each for the Baseline and Forecast Preferences treatments. Under the hypothesis that there is
no dierence across treatments, twice the dierence between the sum of the likelihoods in the individual
treatment estimates and the likelihood from the pooled estimate will be chi-square distributed with 1 degree
of freedom. Summing our likelihoods in this way, we arrive at a test statistic of 1.5 (p=0.220), evincing
no signicant dierence between the treatments. A simple (though extremely conservative) alternative test
of such a dierence across the treatments can be accomplished visually using the predictions in Figure 4.
The dashed lines in each panel of Figure 4 show predictions from the other treatment. Predictions from the
preference treatment fall, at each level of signal strength, within the 95 % condence interval of the baseline
prediction. Thus, our data fails to produce evidence that manipulation signicantly alters observer forecasts.
This provides us with a sixth nding.
Finding 6 Manipulation does not reduce the accuracy of observer forecasts.
5 Discussion
We conducted laboratory experiments studying how well asset markets function as forecasting tools. Un-
informed third party observers were asked to forecast a stochastic event after watching trade in a market
8Variables have the same interpretation as corresponding variables in (8)
15populated by partially informed traders. In one treatment, selling constraints lead to severe biases in the
price formation process. Still, observers tended to correctly forecast the event using the market data. In a
second treatment, half of the traders in the market were given preferences over the forecasts of observers.
These subjects attempted to manipulate prices by submitting more extreme orders than normal traders.
These manipulation attempts, however, failed to negatively impact the accuracy of observer forecasts.
Two main conclusions can be drawn from our study. First, inecient asset prices do not necessarily
imply equally inecient capital allocation decisions. Our subjects seem to exhibit rational expectations
regarding pathologies in the price formation process and at least partially lter these pathologies when
forming forecasts. The result is forecasts that are superior to those that would be made by simply interpreting
prices as ecient probability estimates. Second, our results suggest that price manipulation is a largely
ineective strategy for altering the beliefs of investors and other decision makers. Several features of our
experimental design were included to favor successful manipulation. In each market, half of the traders
were given coordinated incentives to manipulate and these incentives were sucient to signicantly alter
the orders these subjects submitted. Moreover, other traders and observers were kept in the dark about the
direction in which manipulation incentives ran, making it dicult to counteract or discount their eects on
prices. Still, the manipulation eort we observe failed to reduce the accuracy of observers' forecasts.
Both of these conclusions merit further study and robustness tests. Experiments designed with even
stronger incentives to manipulate seem especially appropriate. While it seems likely that this would lead to
more intensive manipulation attempts, it is unclear whether this would signicantly alter the aggregation and
forecasting conclusions reported here. Further research also seems warranted on the correspondence between
secondary market prices and the eciency of capital allocation. While our results suggest that rational
expectations can limit the degree to which inecient prices mislead primary investors, it is unclear how far
this reasoning can be taken. Experiments varying the eciency of market prices (perhaps by manipulating
share endowments) would provide a clearer picture of the relationship between price eciency and forecast
eciency. It also seems fruitful to study forecasting in markets which are inecient for less predictable
reasons than order constraints. One obvious candidate is markets which are subject to endogenous price
bubbles ala (Smith, Suchanek and Williams, 1988).
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